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The generation and implementation of ideas, or knowledge, is crucial for economic performance.
We study this process in a model of endogenous growth with frictions. Productivity increases with
knowledge, which advances via innovation, and with the exchange of ideas from those who generate
them to those best able to implement them (technology transfer). But frictions in this market,
including search, bargaining, and commitment problems, impede exchange and thus slow growth.
We characterize optimal policies to subsidize research and trade in ideas, given both knowledge and
search externalities. We discuss the roles of liquidity and ﬁnancial institutions, and show two ways
in which intermediation can enhance eﬃciency and innovation. First, intermediation allows us to
ﬁnance more transactions with fewer assets. Second, it ameliorates certain bargaining problems,
by allowing entrepreneurs to undo otherwise sunk investments in liquidity. We also discuss some
evidence, suggesting that technology transfer is a signiﬁcant source of innovation and showing how
it is aﬀected by credit considerations.
JEL numbers: D83, D92, G10
Keywords: Growth; Innovation; Technology Transfer; Financial Frictions
∗Chiu: Bank of Canada; Meh: Bank of Canada; Wright: University of Wisconsin and Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis. We thank many friends and colleaguesf o rc o m m e n t so ne a r l i e rw o r ko nt h i sa n dr e l a t e d
projects. Wright thanks the Bank of Canada for their hospitality, as well as the NSF and the Ray Zemon
Chair in Liquid Assets at the Wisconsin School of Business for support. The views expressed herein are those
of the authors and not necessarily those of the Bank of Canada, the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, or
the Federal Reserve System.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is commonly argued that the generation and implementation of new ideas — i.e., the evolution
of knowledge — is a major factor underlying economic performance and growth, and that ﬁnancial
development plays a role in this process.1 This project is an attempt to better understand these
issues. To this end, we build an endogenous growth model where productivity increases with knowl-
edge and knowledge increases with research and development. We model the endogenous decision
of agents to try to come up with and implement new ideas. Additionally, based on the premise that
some agents are better than others at implementation, we explicitly model the exchange of ideas, or
technology transfer. Our idea market is characterized by several explicit frictions, including search,
bargaining and commitment problems that impede credit arrangements. These can all hinder the
reallocation of ideas across agents, and hence the advance of knowledge. Financial intermediation
can ameliorate these frictions, to some extent, and this is the channel through which it enhances
economic growth.
We are interested in studying both the generation of new ideas, and the reallocation of these
ideas from innovators to those with comparative advantage in implementation. On the former issue,
we study how an economy might try to achieve a socially optimal level of innovative activity, which
is interesting because knowledge is at least partly a public good, and hence ought to be subsidized.
On the latter issue, we are interested in the exchange of ideas in the presence of frictions. The
idea market is a thin market and agents are not generally price takers. Coming up with new ideas
may involve ﬁxed costs that cannot be recouped due to holdup problems in bargaining, leading to
ineﬃciently low innovative activity. There is also the basic matching problem of getting innovators
with good potential ideas together with the right entrepreneur to implement them. And there may
be ﬁnancial frictions that make it diﬃcult to pay for ideas, which means it can be important to have
institutions that help get liquid assets from those who need them less to those that need them more.
Our goal is to model all of this explicitly.
1See any modern text on growth theory, such as Aghion and Howitt (1997) or Acemoglu (2009), and references
therein, for extended discussions. An early proponent of the view that ﬁnancial development is critical for growth
is Goldsmith (1967). Recent work building on these ideas includes Greenwood, Sanchez and Wang (2008,2010) and
references therein. See also the survey by Levine (2005).
1In our framework, individual producers have access to the frontier technology ,w h i c hi si nt h e
public domain, but also come up with ideas for innovations that increase their own productivity
.I n c r e a s e si n raise individual proﬁts in the short run, then knowledge enters the public domain
in the longer run. In the simplest case, an individual innovator  with an idea tries to develop it
on his own, and only succeeds with probability , which is itself random (think of  as indexing
the quality of the match between an idea and the individual’s expertise). Each innovation advances
individual productivity by some amount, and these aggregate to give the evolution of the technology
frontier. We show how the model generates a balanced growth equilibrium, where the growth rate
depends on the number of innovators, their probabilities of success, the distance by which innovations
move knowledge, and the way improvements in individual productivity aﬀect the frontier technology.
This benchmark, however, is only a stepping stone toward our study of economies where individual
innovators do not necessarily implement ideas on their own, but instead may trade them.
This activity is described in the literature in terms of the following trade-oﬀ: When innovators
come up with new ideas, should they try to implement them themselves? Or should they try to trade
their ideas to others, say entrepreneurs, who may be better at development, marketing and related
activities? If agents are heterogeneous in their ability to come up with ideas and to extract their
returns, it makes sense for some to specialize in research and others in development. In this way, the
exchange of ideas leads to a more eﬃcient use of resources and increases the incentive to innovate.
As Katz and Shapiro (1986) put it “Inventor-founded startups are often second-best, as innovators
do not have the entrepreneurial skills to commercialize new ideas or products.” As a special feature
in The Economist (2005) on the market for ideas reports: “as the patent system has evolved, it
... leads to a degree of specialization that makes business more eﬃcient. Patents are transferable
assets, and by the early 20th century they had made it possible to separate the person who makes an
invention from the one who commercializes it. This recognized the fact that someone who is good at
coming up with ideas is not necessarily the best person to bring these ideas to market.” Lamoreaux
and Sokoloﬀ (1999) argue that the “The growth of the U.S. economy over the nineteenth century
was characterized by a sharp acceleration of the rate of inventive activity and a dramatic rise in
the relative importance of highly specialized inventors as generators of new technological knowledge.
2Relying on evidence compiled from patent records, we argue that the evolution of a market for
technology played a central role in these developments” (emphasis added).
Financial intermediation can aﬀect development by facilitating the redirection of resources from
less productive to more productive uses. Here the resources in question are ideas. Of course, direct
technology transfers are but one mechanism by which innovators and entrepreneurs interact to share
knowledge and develop ideas — e.g., they can alternatively enter into longer-term partnerships, as
in the venture capital market (Gompers and Lerner 1999). Our entrepreneurs are not in search of
money to start a business; they have money, if sometimes not enough, plus skills, and what they
need is to ﬁnd someone with a good idea for sale. We focus on situations where an innovator wants
to sell his idea outright, rather than enter a joint venture. One very important advantage of direct
technology transfer is that it avoids strategic problems with joint implementation, as we discuss
below. Another is that it allows innovators to get “back to the drawing board” in an eﬀort to come
up with more new ideas, which is their specialty, rather than getting tied up in development. Because
this seems interesting, and is somewhat neglected in growth theory, we focus on direct technology
transfers and model the market where this happens as one in which frictions play a role.2
Another factor we emphasize is liquidity, which determines the ability of entrepreneurs to pay
up front. This can be motivated by limited commitment problems that impede credit. Commitment
issues are important in this context because knowledge is diﬃcult to collateralize — if you give
someone your idea in exchange for promised future payments, and they renege, it is hard to repossess
the information, depending of course on intellectual property rights, patent protection, etc. Other
concerns include adverse selection (how does one know your idea is any good before one buys it) and
moral hazard (how does one know you will carry your weight in a joint project). The ﬁrst principle
of Contract Theory is that the ﬁrst best can be achieved if you sell your idea outright, internalizing
2Why search-and-bargaining frictions? One reason is generality: one can think of a standard competitive market as
the special case where these frictions vanish (the large literature on this topic is summarized in, e.g., Mortensen and
Wright 2002). Another reason is that this is how people who study the market say it works. Sakakibara (2010), e.g.,
claims that “since there is no public market for patents, the price of patents is determined by a private negotiation
between a licensor and a licensee.” Using 661 patent licensing contracts between 1998-2003 the author documents
that “once the matching process is completed, the terms of the contract are negotiated between a licensor and a
licensee” (emphasis added). Also, using data on U.S. patent records and patent lawyers over the nineteeth century,
Lamoreaux and Sokoloﬀ (1999) argue that “it was evident patent agents and lawyers often perform the functions of
intermediaries in the market for technology, matching inventors seeking to to sell new technological ideas with buyers
eager to develop, commercialize, or invest in them.” We do not model this role for patent agents and lawyers explicitly,
but this speaks to the importance of matching in this market.
3the incentive problems. For Contract Theory to be relevant, there needs to be some appeal to
liquidity constraints. We model this explicitly, and, moreover, we make liquidity endogenous. This
allows us to discuss the impact of ﬁnancial development on the idea market, and hence on growth,
by introducing intermediaries whose role is to channel liquidity from those that have more than they
need to those that have less.
Before proceeding, we clarify why we call the objects being traded in the model ideas, and
not simply some generic factor of production, even if many of the insights apply more generally.
Ideas here are indeed factors of production, but of a particular type that expands knowledge and
raises productivity. Importantly, ideas are nonrival goods, at least in the long run, when knowledge
enters the public domain. This means there is typically ineﬃcient investment in innovation, from a
social perspective, and we characterize the optimal corrective tax-subsidy schemes, which is made
all the more interesting by search and bargaining frictions. Also, at least to some extent, ideas are
indivisible (either you tell someone or you don’t), although this is more of a technical consideration
than a critical component of our theory. And, as we said, ideas are diﬃcult to collateralize, making
credit problematic in the presence of limited commitment, and motivating the consideration of
liquidity. Lastly, the idea market is rife with information problems, including adverse selection and
moral hazard, as mentioned above, making technology transfer preferable to joint ventures.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model, without trade
in ideas, and shows how it generates a unique balanced growth equilibrium. Even in this simplest
context, one can endogenize the growth rate by introducing a free entry condition for potential
innovators. We show that there is generally underproduction of knowledge in equilibrium, because
it is to some extent a public good, and derive the optimal corrective policy. Section 3 studies
trade between innovators and entrepreneurs without credit frictions, and again gives conditions
3Another response to frictions in the idea market, along the lines of Coase’s (1937) theory of the ﬁrm, is to bring
R&D in house (similar to, but not the same as, joint ventures). This is not inconsisent with our general view,
although we do think the model applies more directly to technology purchases from the outside — i.e., to arm’s length
transactions, descibed by Investopedia as follows: “The concept of an arm’s length transaction is to ensure that both
parties in the deal are acting in their own self interest and are not subject to any pressure or duress from the other
party. ... For example, if two strangers are involved in the sale and purchase of a house, it is likely that the ﬁnal
agreed-upon price will be close to market value (assuming that both parties have equal bargaining power and equal
information about the situation). This is because the seller would want a price that is as high as possible and the
buyer would want a price that is as low as possible. This contrasts with a situation in which the two parties are not
strangers. For example, it is unlikely that the same transaction involving a father and his son would yield the same
r e s u l t ,b e c a u s et h ef a t h e rm a yc h o o s et og i v eh i ss o nad i s c o u n t . ”
4for a unique balanced growth equilibrium. In this model we can allow entry into either, or both,
innovative and entrepreneurial activity, and again derive the optimal corrective policy in the presence
of both knowledge and search externalities. Section 4 introduces frictions that make it diﬃcult to
trade ideas on credit, leading to a role for liquidity. In this model innovation can be hindered by a
shortage of liquid assets, but even if liquidity is plentiful and we implement the optimal policy, we do
not generally get eﬃciency due to bargaining problems. Section 5 introduces ﬁnancial intermediaries
that serve to reallocate liquidity across agents. We show how intermediation allows the economy to
ﬁnance more transactions with a given quantity of assets. Moreover, it helps get around the above-
mentioned bargaining friction. This novel eﬀect arises, intuitively, by allowing entrepreneurs to undo
otherwise sunk investments in liquidity, thereby alleviating holdup problems. Section 6 sketches some
evidence suggesting that technology transfers spur innovation and showing how credit imperfections
hinder this process. Section 7 concludes. Technical results are relegated to the Appendices.4
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
A [01] continuum of agents live forever in discrete time. Each period, there convenes a frictionless
centralized market where agents trade consumption , labor hours , and an asset .W e t a k e 
as numeraire,  as the wage and  as the asset price. We think of  as claims to Lucas (1978)
trees, in ﬁxed supply  and bearing dividend , except here the dividend is not consumption but
an intermediate good that is transformed into  according to technology  =  where  is the
aggregate state of knowledge (productivity). Thus,  is the price of intermediate goods in terms of
numeraire. The value function for agents in the centralized market is
(;)=m a x
0 {() −  + (00)} (1)
st  =(  + ) + − 0 + ()
4Our approach is related to Holmes and Schmitz (1990,1995), who also assume individuals diﬀer in implemen-
tation ability, but they only study perfectly competitive markets while we allow frictions to play a role, endogenize
growth, and study the eﬀects of taxation and liquidity/intermediation. Many people have studied credit frictions
and entrepreneurship; for a recent source of references, again see Greenwood et al. (2010), as well as Chatterjee and
Rossi-Hansberg (2010) or Silveira and Wright (2010), who focus especially on the idea market. We also mention a
recent paper that develops a similar model by Berentsen, Roja Breu and Shi (2009). Also related is work by Lucas
(2009), Alvarez, Buera and Lucas (2008), and Lucas and Moll (2011). These papers all study similar issues, but our
approach is diﬀerent. In Lucas and Moll, e.g., while there is search/matching, agents learn nonrival ideas passively
from those they meet; by contrast, our agents must buy ideas at negotiated prices; knowledge is rival in the short
run but a public good in the long run; we explictly consider ex ante investment (entry) into R&D; we have labor,
consumption and idea markets, and we explicitly model the role of liquidity/intermediation.
5where () satisﬁes the standard assumptions,  (00) is the continuation value, and () is proﬁt
as a function of individual productivity , distinguished from . There is no reproducible physical
capital in the benchmark model, but in Appendix 1 we show how to include it.
We interpret each individual as an owner/operator of his ﬁrm, although it is equivalent to engage
a manager to operate it. In either case, their problem is
()=m a x

{() − } (2)
where () satisﬁes the usual assumptions and  is labor demand. Individuals may work at their
own ﬁrms, but additionally work for (hire) others when (). Output () is in units of
the intermediate good, which is transformed into () units of . Individual productivity  may
diﬀer from the aggregate , depending on whether an agent innovates. There are for now only two
types of agents: a fraction ¯  have an opportunity to innovate, while the remaining 1 − ¯  do not.
Each period, all agents start with the same aggregate knowledge , but those with an opportunity
to innovate come up with an idea. Not all ideas come to fruition: the success probability is ,w h e r e
 is a random draw from CDF ().5 Each success increases individual productivity from  = 
to  =( 1+). Thus, an innovator’s individual productivity is given by:
 =
½
(1 + ) with prob 
 with prob 1 − 
One can think of  as capturing the quality of an idea combined with the skill that any individual
has at implementing it, to motivate the analysis below where agents trade ideas, although for now
the idea market is shut down and agents must try to develop ideas on their own. The number of
successful innovations is  =¯ 
R
()=¯ E. Note that although the probability of success
is random, each successful innovation advances productivity by a deterministic amount ;w ea l s o
solved the case where  is random, and it did not add much other than notation. The aggregate
state of knowledge evolves from one period to the next according to 0 = (). Ideas are public
goods in the long run, in the sense that after they are put into production, they enter the public
domain and yield an advance in aggregate productivity after one period (it is not hard to extend
5All innovators draw from the same ; the subscript merely indicates that this distribution is associated with
innovators, as later we introduce a diﬀerent type, entrepreneurs, who draw from another distribution. Also, we proceed
as if types are permanent, but the results are exactly the same if every agent realizes an opportunity to innovate each
period with probability ¯ .
6this to many periods). Knowledge in the public domain is higher next period if more ideas are
implemented successfully in the current period, 0() ≥ 0.








where  is an exogenous component and  is a parameter aﬀecting the substitutability of individual
innovations in generating aggregate knowledge. As special cases, before adjusting for ,w eh a v et h e
following:  =1implies productivity next period is given by average productivity this period (we all
contribute equally to the frontier);  =+ ∞ implies it is given by maximum productivity (we stand
on the shoulders of those giants with the very best knowledge); and  = −∞ i m p l i e si ti sg i v e nb y
minimum productivity (we are dragged down by the worst, as in “O-ring” theory).6 It is easy to
see (3) implies 0 = [(1 + ) +( 1− )]
1 . However, except for constructing examples, we
do not need any particular functional form, and the growth rate generally is written
1+ = 0 = () (4)
We seek a balanced growth equilibrium,w h e r e,  and  grow at the same rate as , while  is











































6Notice that an agent with productivity  who fails to innovate this period uses the fontier 0 next period, and it
is possible that 0  ; one can always raise the exogenous component  in (3), however, if one wants to avoid this.
7These simpliﬁcations are due to quasi-linear utility. As in models following Lagos and Wright (2005), this facilitates
the analytics by reducing the dimensionality of the state space, since we do not have to track the distribution of wealth.
It is not hard to generalize this, in principle, using numerical methods.
7The continuation value depends on whether an agent has an opportunity to innovate: for those




{ [(1 + );]+( 1− )(;)}()
= (;)+E{ [(1 + );] − (;)} (7)
which is the payoﬀ from entering the centralized market with  = , plus the expected surplus from
innovation. Given this, plus the linearity of  in , we can insert the derivative  =  into the






0 + 0) (8)
It is easy to verify that  = (1 − ) is the unique bounded and non-negative solution to (8)
( i ti se a s i e s ti fo n ew r i t e si ta sad i ﬀerence equation in ). Hence, the asset must be priced
fundamentally — i.e., by the present value of its dividend stream,  = (1 − ).
In addition to the asset price , the price of intermediate goods , and the price of consumption
normalized to 1, we need to determine the wage. By Walras’ Law we can ﬁnd  either from goods-




() +  = (1 + )(1)+( 1− )(0)+
where 1 solves (2) for successful innovators and 0 solves it for the rest. From the FOC, (1 +
)0(1)= and 0(0)=, clearly, 0 and 1 depend only on .G i v e n , supply is








In terms of demand  = (),t h er e l e v a n tF O Ci s0()=. In general, demand is





To get balanced growth we need ()=l o g ( ),w h i c hm e a n s =  and an increase in  does
8not aﬀect demand.8 Setting ()=() yields the market clearing condition


= [(1 + )(1)+( 1− )(0)+] (9)
which depends only on the normalized wage, ¯  =  since 1 and 0 are functions only of ¯ .
It is obvious that this has a unique solution for ¯ , from which we easily determine the rest of the
endogenous variables.
As an example, suppose ()=1− exp(−).T h e n p r o ﬁt maximization implies (1)=
1 − (1 + ) and (0)=1− . This makes supply linear, ()= (1 + + ) − ,s o
we can solve explicitly for the normalized wage
¯  =
(1 + + )
1+

From this we get  = , and the rest of the endogenous variables. Although this example is
particularly easy, due to linear supply, for any increasing and concave () the results are basically
the same. In general, the growth rate  is given by (4), which depends on technological parameters
plus the number of ideas successfully implemented,  =¯ E, which in this simplest benchmark
depends only on ¯  and the distribution . As the average match between ideas and implementation
skills, parameterized by ,i m p r o v e s , increases, along with  and . Improvement in the overall
quality of ideas, captured by the distance they move knowledge ,h a ss i m i l a re ﬀects. An increase
in the eﬀective stock of assets, ,r a i s e s and , through a wealth eﬀect, but not .
This basic framework can be put to work even before introducing technology transfer. Consider
giving potential innovators a choice over whether to participate in research-related activity at cost
.L e t t h e n u m b e ro factive innovators be  ∈ [0 ¯ ]. The probability of success is E,a n dt h e
gain normalized by  is ∆ =( 1−0),w i t h1 = (1+)(1)−1 and 0 = (0)−0.
Since (5) implies that  is linear in wealth with slope , the expected gain from a successful





0 if   ¯ 
[0 ¯ ] if  =¯ 
¯  if   ¯ 
(10)
8As is standard, balanced growth requires either  =l o g ( )+() or  = (),w h e r e() satisﬁes the usual
assumptions. We have already assumed  is seperable, so we need ()=l o g ( ). See Waller (2010) for a recent
discussion of balanced growth in related models.
9Equilibrium is characterized by two curves shown in ( ¯ ) space in Figure 1, one representing
entry (10) and the other representing market clearing (9), where now  = E since only  ≤ ¯ 
potential innovators are active. Here the entry condition gives a horizontal line at ¯  = ∆E,
while the market clearing curve is strictly increasing. Equilibrium exists uniquely, and it is easy to see
how it varies with parameters. Assuming an interior equilibrium,  ∈ (0 ¯ ),a ni n c r e a s ei n shifts
the entry curve down, reducing research-related activity  and hence growth. So does an increase
in , this time through a shift in the market clearing condition. In terms of employment, it is easy
to check that an increase in  raises both 0 and 1, but not necessarily  = 1 +( 1− )0
because  falls. These and several other results are summarized in Table A.
0 1 ¯      
 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ 0 ↓ ↓
 ↑ 0 0 0 ↓ 0 0 ↓ ↓
 ↑ 0 0 0 ↓ 0 ↑ ↓ ↓
 ↑ ↓ ? ↑ ? ↑ 0 ? ?
 ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ? ? 0 ? ?
 ↑ 0 0 0 0 0 ↑ 0 0
Table A: Eﬀects of Parameters with Perfect Credit
In terms of welfare, there is no presumption that equilibrium is eﬃcient, since knowledge is at
least partially a public good. Consider the planner’s problem:
()= m a x
01
{() − [1 +( 1− )0] −  +  [()]} (11)
st  = (1 + )(1)+( 1− )(0)+,
 ∈ [0 ¯ ],  = E
The FOC for  implies
 = {0()[(1 + )(1) − (0)] − (1 − 0)+ 0(0)0()}E (12)
The RHS of (12) is the marginal social beneﬁt of innovative activity: the gain due to higher short-
run output 0()[(1 + )(1) − (0)], net of the change in labor cost (1 − 0),p l u st h e
discounted beneﬁt of better knowledge in the future  0(0)0(), all multiplied by the probability

















10Note how (13) takes account of the fact that knowledges last forever. Combining (13) and (12),








where  =1  − 1 is the rate of time preference. The analogous equilibrium condition is  =
0()∆E, which generates too little entry, because in their private calculus innovators ignore
the permanent external impact of knowledge. To correct this one can introduce a subsidy  that
reduces the cost of innovative activity to  − , ﬁnanced by a lump-sump tax which (with quasi-
linear utility) aﬀects leisure but no other interesting variables. The following is now obvious from
the discussion.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique equilibrium with balanced growth at rate  given by (4), either
with  ﬁxed or with entry. Equilibrium is generally ineﬃcient without intervention. The optimal





3 Technology Transfer with Perfect Credit
Having described existence, uniqueness, the eﬀects of parameter changes and welfare in the baseline
model, we now consider technology transfer by introducing entrepreneurs, who do not come up with
ideas on their own, but may have a comparative advantage in implementation. The measures of
innovators and entrepreneurs are ¯  and ¯  ≤ 1−¯ ; we can also have 1−¯ −¯  agents who work and
consume but do not get involved in either innovative or entrepreneurial activity. Now, each period,
just before the opening of the frictionless centralized market, there convenes a decentralized market
for ideas where entrepreneurs and innovators meet bilaterally according to a standard Pissarides
(2000) matching technology, giving the number of meetings (¯  ¯ ) as a function of the measures
of agents. There can be gains from trade because  may be better at implementing some ideas than
.T h u s ,s u p p o s e has an idea that succeeds with probability  drawn from (), and he meets
;i f takes over implementation, he succeeds with probability  drawn from (|),w h e r eb y
assumption  and  both observe ().
11A meeting occurs for  in the idea market with probability  = (¯  ¯ )¯ , and similarly for
. Thus, with probability 1−,  cannot trade, because he meets no one, but we can alternatively
interpret this in terms of informational frictions by assuming  may not know (). Suppose that
sometimes  meets someone with an idea outside his area of expertise, whence he may choose to not
trade, lest he get a bad idea (a lemon). If anyone can come up with a bad idea for free, then, as in
Lester et al. (2011),  will never trade for something he cannot evaluate. Thus we reinterpret search
in terms of private information, with  being the probability  meets  times the probability he can
evaluate the idea. This story is simplistic, but more sophisticated versions in related search-and-
bargaining models are studied in recent papers by Li and Rocheteau (2009) and Rocheteau (2009),
who also provide references to much earlier work. While more should be done modeling information
explicitly, here we proceed as if () i sk n o w ni ne v e r ym e e t i n g .
In any case, at the beginning of each period, all agents see the aggregate state of knowledge 
and then innovators come up with new ideas — i.e., they draw . Then the matching begins. In
any meeting where there are gains from trade,   , the parties  and  bargain over a payment
 that the latter will make to the former in the next centralized market. For now we abstract from
liquidity considerations by assuming that  can commit to any payment in the relevant range. To
determine , we use the generalized Nash solution, with  denoting the bargaining power of .T h e
linearity of  r e d u c e st h i st o
 =a r gm a x[ ∆ − ]
 [ − ∆]
1− 
This is easily solved for
 = ()=∆[ +( 1− )] (15)
indicating that  is an average of the success probabilities, times the value of innovation deﬁned
above as ∆ =( 1 − 0).
Whoever takes the idea out of the market then tries to implement it, improving individual
productivity from  =  to  = (1+) if successful. To reduce notation we assume that ideas are
rival goods, in the short run, in the sense that if  trades an idea he cannot also try to implement
it (one can easily allow ideas to be nonrival, or partially nonrival, even in the short run without
12changing the qualitative results in these kinds of models; see Silveira and Wright 2010). After
the idea market closes, agents enter the centralized market and solve the problem in Section 2,
summarized by (5), except for two new features. First, we have to add or subtract from income
any payment an agent is owed or owes from the previous idea market, but just like a lump sum
tax only this eﬀects leisure. Second, we have to index the value functions by type. Using (15), for




∆ + (1 − )

¯ 




∆ˆ E( − ) (17)
where






Compared with (7),  can still try to implement his own idea, but he may sell it to , the expected
surplus from which is the last term in (16); meanwhile,  only gets ideas via trade, although one
could alternatively allow him to come up with some on his own, too.
Other than opening up trade in ideas, everything is the same as the benchmark model in Section
2. The only equilibrium condition that changes is the number of successful innovations,
 =¯ E +¯ ˆ E( − )
where the ﬁrst term is the number of success when ideas are implemented by innovators and the
second captures the additional successes gained by technology transfer in any match where   .
The growth rate is still 1+ = (), although  is diﬀerent. Thus, growth now depends on the
measures ¯  and ¯ , the distributions  and , and the matching function .N o t i c e t h a t  is
independent of  and  here, although this will change when we introduce credit frictions.9
As above we can consider endogenous entry. In fact, since  () is concave, we can have two-
sided entry, which is not the case in the typical search model (e.g., Pissarides 2000) that has a linear
technology. Thus, both  and  choose whether to participate in the idea market, at costs  and
9It is easy to work out examples generalizing those in Section 2, with ()=[(1 + ) +1− ]1 and
()=1− exp(−).F o r and ,s u p p o s et h a t =1with probability 1 while  is uniform on [01].T h e nw e
have: (i) if  =1then  = [ +( )]2−(1 − );( i i )i f = ∞ then  = (1+)−2; and (iii) if  = −∞ then
 =  − 1.
13, resp. The measure of active innovators  still satisﬁes (10) from Section 2, except that now
¯  = 0()∆[E +( 1− )
()






0 if   ¯ 
[0 ¯ ] if  =¯ 
¯  if   ¯ 
(18)
with ¯  = 0()∆
()

ˆ E( − ). Equilibrium is characterized by (18) and (10), plus market
clearing (9) with  = E + ( )ˆ E( − ). In Appendix 2 we show there exists a unique
interior equilibrium,  ∈ (0 ¯ ) and  ∈ (0 ¯ ),a sl o n ga s and  are neither too high nor low.
In terms of eﬃciency, the generalized version of the planner’s problem in (11) is
()= m a x
01
{() − [1 +( 1− )0] −  −  +  [()]} (19)
st  = (1 + )(1)+( 1− )(0)+,
 ∈ [0 ¯ ],  ∈ [0 ¯ ],  = E + ( )ˆ E( − )
Here the planner takes as given the matching process, and that agents trade ideas iﬀ   ,a s
they should. He also takes as given that the payment  is determined by bargaining with parameter
, and can only choose participation in the idea market (plus consumption and employment in the














[E + ( )ˆ E( − )]
Comparing these with the relevant equilibrium conditions, we can ﬁnd the optimal corrective subsi-
dies. Summarizing the results, we have:
Proposition 2 As long as  and  are neither too high nor too low, there exists a unique interior
equilibrium with two-sided entry. Equilibrium is generally ineﬃcient without intervention. The
optimal policy, which yields the same outcome as the planner’s problem, involves subsidies:
 =
0()( )ˆ E( − )
()








0()[E +  ( ) ˆ E( − )]
()







14To explain the policy results, note than in addition to ineﬃciencies due to knowledge externalities
discussed in Section 2, there are now also search externalities, depending on idea-market tightness
. Knowledge externalities are captured by the ﬁrst terms in the optimal subsidies, as in
Proposition 1. Search externalities are captured by the second terms, which build on the usual Hosios
(1990) conditions requiring agents’ bargaining power to be commensurate with their contribution to
the matching process. For entrepreneurs this means  = , and for innovators 1− = .
Constant returns in the matching function implies that one holds iﬀ the other holds, so the Hosios
condition generates eﬃcient participation by both  and .E v e ni f satisﬁes the Hosios condition,
we still want to subsidize participation due to knowledge externalities; if the Hosios condition fails,
policy has to balance search versus knowledge externalities.
Although two-sided entry is interesting, consider the special case where ¯  is ﬁxed — say, all
entrepreneurs participate because  =0— so that we can more easily compare results with those
in Section 2 where the idea market was shut down. The diﬀerence can be seen in Figure 1, where
the participation condition (10) is given by a horizontal line at ¯  = ∆E when the idea market
is shut down, but now slopes downward because entry causes congestion, reducing ’s idea-market
arrival rate and hence the return to innovation. The other equilibrium condition, market clearing
(9), still generates a strictly increasing curve. We again have the existence of a unique equilibrium,
and one can show that the qualitative eﬀects of the parameter changes shown in Table A are exactly
the same in this model. However, there are also new eﬀects when the idea market is open, related
to search-and-bargaining parameters.
An increase in entrepreneurs’ bargaining power  lowers the return to innovation, shifting down
the curve deﬁned by ’s entry condition. This reduces , and hence  , , ¯  and . Additionally,
increasing the matching rate, either because the technology ( ) improves or we increase the
measure of entrepreneurs, shifts up both curves. This increases ¯ ,w h i c hl o w e r s0 and 1,a n d
then (9) implies  unambiguously increases. Hence we have higher growth, despite the fact that 
may go up or down when we increase the matching rate. When  =1 , e.g., innovators get no return
from idea trade, due to a standard holdup problem: at the time of the bargaining,  is a sunk cost,
and does not aﬀect . Of course this holdup problem occurs for any 0,b u ti nt h ee x t r e m ec a s e
15 =1the entry curve is again horizontal, as in Figure 1, even though the idea market is open. An
increase in the matching rate in this case implies  must fall, while ¯  does not change, and so 
does not change, by (9). This complete-crowding-out eﬀect, with the fall in  exactly oﬀsetting
the improvement in matching, requires  =1 , but it illustrates how holdup problems in bargaining
generally aﬀect the return to and hence the amount of innovative activity.
The optimal subsidy  in the one-sided entry model is still given by Proposition 2. Again the
knowledge externality implies  is too low and should be subsidized, but if  is below the value
given by the Hosios condition we may want to tax entry to reduce congestion, with the optimal
policy balancing knowledge and search externalities. One result we highlight is that increasing the
eﬃciency of the matching technology — a reduction in search frictions — necessarily improves the
allocation emerging from the idea market, and hence the implementation of new technologies, even
though it may reduce the initial generation of ideas by crowding out . The extent to which this
happens depends on interactions between search and other frictions, including the holdup problem.
For the record we summarize the main results with one-sided entry as follows:
Proposition 3 As long as  is neither too high nor too low, there exists a unique interior equilib-
rium with one-sided entry. Equilibrium is generally ineﬃcient and the optimal policy, which yields
the same outcome as the planner’s problem, involves a subsidy  as in Proposition 2.
4 Technology Transfer with Imperfect Credit
To begin, assume that  and  are ﬁxed, and as a preliminary step consider an exogenous credit
constraint: when  meets  in the idea market, we impose  ≤ . There are at least two inter-
pretations. One is that  insists on quid pro quo,  is holding transferable assets worth , and he
cannot hand over more than he has (as in many monetary models; see Williamson and Wright 2010
f o ras u r v e y ) . A n o t h e ri st h a t can secure a loan from  —t r a d ec r e d i t—t ob ep a i do ﬀ in the
next centralized market, but only up to the value  of his assets that he can pledge as collateral
(as in many imperfect credit models; see Gertler and Kiyotaki 2010 for a survey). On the ﬁrst
interpretation there is ﬁnal settlement when ideas are traded. On the second interpretation there is
deferred settlement, with  either paying oﬀ his debt in the next centralized market, or, equivalently,
16surrendering collateral of the same value. Other than the timing of settlement, nothing of substance
depends on which interpretation one adopts here.
In any case, for an idea-market trade to occur, once  and  have met two conditions now also
have to be met:  must have comparative advantage in terms of implementation,  ≤ ;a n d
must be big enough to cover ’s reservation price ∆. Thus, we need  ≤ min{∆}.I f t h e
bargaining solution derived without liquidity constraints in Section 3 satisﬁes  ≤ ,t h e nw es e t















When   (∆), the unconstrained  is infeasible, and we have the following: if ∆ ≥ 
they close the deal with  paying ¯  =  ;a n di f∆   there is no trade because  does not
cover ’s reservation price. This is illustrated in Figure 2. There is no trade in the region labeled A0
because    means there are no gains from trade. There is no trade in A3 because  cannot meet
’s reservation price. There is unconstrained trade in A1,w h e r e pays .A n dt h e r ei sc o n s t r a i n e d
trade in A2,w h e r e pays ¯  = .10
Market supply and demand for goods are the same as before, given ,b u tn o w
 =¯ E +¯ ¯ E( − ;) (21)
where
¯ E( − ;)=E( − |min{∆}  )Pr(min{∆}  )
We still write supply and demand as in Section 2, but now there is an additional eﬀect on supply












10Here we simply impose a particular bargaining protocol: use Nash if the buyer can aﬀord it; else, have him oﬀer
all he has. One could in principle try to adapt the axioms in cooperative bargaining theory to generate this type of
outcome as a result (see, e.g., the survey in Thomson 1994). Or one can write down simple strategic models where
it emerges as an equilibrium. Also, we note that the results here are in part due to the assumption that an idea
is indivisible:  can neither trade part of it, nor trade it with probably less than 1 using a lottery (which would,
by the way, reduce the problem to standard Nash bargaining by convexifying payoﬀ space). But as in Silveira and
Wright (2010) one can show that the main results go through if one relaxes these assumptions, albeit at the expense
of simplicity and notation. With lotteries,  gets paid ﬁrst and then transfers the idea with some probability; this
allows  t og e tm o r eo u to ft h em a r k e t ,b u tt h e r ea r es t i l ls o m em e e t i n g sw h e r eh ei n e ﬃciently keeps idea to himself
even though   . Similarly, if ideas were divisible,  does not transfer enough information to ; the diﬀerence
here is merely whether the ineﬃciency occurs on the intensive or extensive margin.
17The ﬁrst two terms capture the standard result that, holding  ﬁxed, higher  lowers hours and
output. The ﬁnal term is positive, however, because higher  relaxes the liquidity constraint,
spurring trade and hence innovation, which can potentially lead to multiple equilibria.11 In Appendix
3 we provide an explicit example to show multiplicity can arise, but also note that 0()  0,a n d
hence equilibrium must be unique, if  is not too big, as we assume for the present analysis.
Having described the outcome for a ﬁxed , we now want to make it a choice. First, from the
total stock , assume that a fraction 1 =  of assets are liquid in the precise sense that they can
be used to facilitate trade in the idea market — i.e., they are transferable, or pledgeable., depending
on the interpretation as discussed in the ﬁrst paragraph of this Section. While the stock 1 may be
exogenous, the price and hence the value of liquid assets is endogenous, and this is what matters for
t r a d e ,s i n c ew en o wc o n s t r a i n by  =(  + )
0
1. Other than 1, the remaining 0 =( 1−)
assets are illiquid, and do not facilitate idea-market trade, although they can always be traded in
the frictionless centralized market. While it is certainly interesting, and for many issues, essential,
to ask why certain assets can or cannot be traded in certain markets, much good work for all intents
and purposes simply assumes this is the case (e.g., Kiyotaki and Moore 1997 or Holmstrom and
Tirole 2010). While one can try to model this at a deeper level, based on intrinsic properties of
assets like portability and recognizability, this is not the place to go into that.12
The dividend on both 0 and 1 is still  (with no loss of generality), and if the price of  is







As is standard, the illiquid asset 0 must trade at the fundamental price 0 = (1 − ),w h i c h
means 1+0 =( 1+). This is not necessarily true for the liquid asset 1, however, as we shall










11The economics is as follows. When  is higher, individual innovators have less to gain from improving productivity.
We are saying more than the obvious result that proﬁt falls with ,w ea r es a y i n gt h ediﬀerence between proﬁta t
innovative and uninnovative ﬁrms 1 − 0 falls. This lowers ’s reservation price, other things equal, making it
more likely that  has enough liquidity to buy him out, thus increasing the probability of successful implementation.
Through this channel higher wages might lead to more innovation, and since more innovation also leads to higher
wages, multiplicity can arise.
12Again, see Lester et al. (2011), Rocheteau (2009), and Rocheteau and Li (2009) for recent papers that study this
issue using information theory; to be clear, however, we do not think this a closed problem.
18which is the cost of being liquid: it is the rate of return one sacriﬁces by holding 1 rather than 0.
The bargaining outcome is still described by Figure 2, with  =(  + )
0
1 now endogenous,
but predetermined at the time of the meeting. In equilibrium the price of intermediate goods is still
, the price of the illiquid asset 0 is still 0 = (1 − ), and goods market clearing is still
described by (9) with  given by (21). The new equilibrium condition concerns the market for 1,
which clears when the spread  equates demand and supply for liquid assets. In terms of demand,
consider ﬁrst agents who are not entrepreneurs (i.e., they are buyers in the next idea market with
probability 0). Such agents are willing to hold any amount of 1 if the spread is  =0 ,w h i c h
means 1 = 0 is the fundamental price; they demand 0 if 0; and they want an arbitrarily large
position if 0. In other words, demand coming from these agents is horizontal at  =0 .
For entrepreneurs, integrating across the regions in Figure 2, the payoﬀ in the idea market is










[∆ − 1(1 + )] (25)
(see Appendix 4 for details). Notice 1 aﬀects the area of the diﬀerent A regions, and hence the
probability of trade, as well as the terms of trade when the constraint binds, as seen in the integrand
of the last term. It is convenient to redeﬁne ’s centralized market choice as  = 0
1 (1 + ),
rather than 0
1, analogous to using real rather than nominal balances in monetary theory. Also, the
choice of 0
0 is actually irrelevant for ’s payoﬀ, given illiquid assets are priced fundamentally, so we




































































In words, () is ’s marginal beneﬁt of liquidity: the ﬁrst term gives the increase in his expected
payoﬀ from not losing a deal because he cannot meet the reservation price,  ∆; the second
gives the decrease from paying a higher price when he could have done the deal at ¯  = .T h eF O C
19equates this to marginal cost , subject to some details concerning the SOC, or the concavity of the
objective function in (26), which we deal with in the next footnote.
It is now straightforward to describe the (inverse) market demand curve for the liquid asset, say
(),i n() space. If 0 then entrepreneurs want to hold the  that solves  = (),a n d
other agents want 0.W h e n =0 ,  is satiated in liquidity at (0),a tw h i c hp o i n tt h es e c o n dt e r m
in (27) dominates the ﬁrst (this must be the case, e.g., for any  ≥ ∆, since the highest possible
reservation price for an innovator  obtains when  =1 ). In this case entrepreneurs in aggregate
hold (0) units of the liquid asset, and, if there is any left, others hold the rest 1−(0),w h i c h
they are happy to do at  =0 .A n di f is big enough there is no 0 satisfying  = (),s oe v e n
entrepreneurs demand  =0 . Summarizing, one can show that demand by entrepreneurs is strictly
downward sloping in () space, except possibly for some horizontal segments; it hits the -axis at
0; and it hits the -axis at (0).13 The result that entrepreneurs may be satiated in liquidity at
(0), because any additional  would only increase the price in some meetings, can be attributed
to a well-known property of Nash bargaining that buyers’ payoﬀs may decrease when we relax their
constraints (see, e.g., Aruoba et al. 2007). This happens when the real value of liquidity is more
than entrepreneurs demand, in which case the market drives the spread to  =0 .
Moving to the supply side of this market, all we have to do is some accounting. Using the





 − 1¯ 

− 1 (28)
This (inverse) supply relation is the spread (equivalent, the asset price 1) required to make the real
value of 1 equal to .N o t i c e (0) = −∞, 0()  0, 00()  0 and (∞)=, where again  is
the rate of time preference. Combining supply and demand, the asset market clears uniquely when
( ¯ )=0 ,w h e r e
( ¯ ) ≡ () − [∆(¯ )] (29)
13A detailed proof can be found in Wright (2010). Note that the argument does not use the concavity of the objective
function, which is diﬃcult to imagine verifying in a model with generalized Nash (rather than linear) pricing. The
proof proceeds by noting that while there may be multiple solutions to the FOC when the objective function is not
concave, generically there is a unique global maximizer. The horizontal segments in the (inverse) demand curve obtain
at nongeneric values of  that yield multiple global maximizers. In this case, as is standard, we can make market
demand continuous by assigning any measure we like of entrepreurs to diﬀerent global maximizers.
20From (29) we get a unique  for any ¯ ,w i t h¯ 0.
Asset market equilibrium is shown in Figure 3, for diﬀerent values of  that translate into diﬀerent
demand, and diﬀerent values of  that translate into diﬀerent supply, with parameter values given
in the Figure.14 Notice that () can become negative, but market demand () is truncated by the
horizontal axis, since 0 always implies excess demand. Clearly, from the Figure,  can be satiated
below the value of  that guarantees he can close the deal in every idea-market meeting, which in
this example is  =1 . This can only occur if 1,h o w e v e r ;i f =1then  =0implies  chooses
 so that he has enough liquidity to close the deal with probability 1. Intuitively, this is because
liquidity is free at  =0 , and the price does not depend on  when  =1 .T h e s eﬁndings are related
to some results in pure monetary theory (e.g., Lagos and Wright 2005) that can be understood as
follows. When  holds liquid assets he is making an investment, with sunk cost , his loss in rate
of return. If 1, he has to share the surplus generated by this investment with , another hold
up problem. Hence, he under invests unless  =1 .N o t i c et h a t =1does not generally satisfy the
Hosios condition, however, so with endogenous entry there is no way to achieve full eﬃciency simply
by picking , without even accounting for knowledge externalities.
It is clear that if the supply of liquid assets is above some threshold, 1  ∗
1,s a y ,w h e r et h ee x a c t
value of ∗
1 is given in Proposition 4 below, then  =0 ;a n di f1  ∗
1, then liquidity commands a
premium, 0. This is also similar to results in monetary theory (e.g., Geromichalos et al. 2007
or Lagos and Rocheteau 2008); the contribution here is more about deriving the implications for
innovation and growth. To pursue this, recall the usual goods market clearing condition (9), which
we reproduce as ( ¯ )=0with
( ¯ ) ≡
¯ 

− (1 + ) [1(¯ )] − (1 − ) [0(¯ )] −  (30)
One can check that, as long as  is not too big, this delivers  as a function of ¯ ,w i t h¯  ≥ 0.
Equilibrium is characterized by ( ¯ ) satisfying asset- and goods-market clearing, (29)-(30), from
which we can easily ﬁnd ,  etc. As shown in Figure 4, existence and uniqueness are apparent, at
14As an aside, if one knows search-and-bargaining models in monetary theory, one may be perplexed that we can
have 0 when  =0 , as is the case in the Figure if we reduce supply a little more. Why is  willing to pay a
liquidity premium when he has no bargaining power, and hence, presumably, gets no surplus from trade in the idea
market? The resolution of this obstensive puzzle is that he actually does get positive surplus from some trades in the
idea market — those where he is constrained, and pays only ¯  =  .
21least as long as  is not too big, as mentioned above.
0 1 ¯      
 ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑
0 ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ? ?
 ↑ ↓ ? ↑ ? ? ↑ ? ?
 ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ? ? ?
 ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑
 ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
Table B: Eﬀects of Parameters with Imperfect Credit
We report the eﬀects of parameters in Table B, for the case 1  ∗
1, where liquidity is scarce.
An increase in , e.g., shifts the  curve up while  is unaﬀected. This increases , ¯  and,
consequently, growth. Intuitively, low  makes  try to economize on liquidity, since he gets less
of the idea-market surplus, as mentioned above, and this means he more frequently cannot meet
the reservation price, which reduces technology transfer, innovation and growth. One can similarly
show growth increases if matching frictions are reduced, or  increases, but not necessarily if 
increases. The key here is that there are two channels at work. Consider a rise in ¯ . This shifts
 and  up, promoting growth via two eﬀects. First, there are simply more meetings in the
idea market, so we get more ideas into the hands of those best able to develop them. Second, since
t h ei n c r e a s ei n raises the matching probability , the demand for and price of liquid assets goes
up. There is now more real liquidity in the system, making the constraint  ≤  less severe. An
increase in , however, while still increasing meetings, reduces rather than increases , which has
a negative eﬀect on liquidity via the second channel. In general, whenever there are direct eﬀects on
the idea market, there are general equilibrium eﬀects in the asset market that should also be taken
into account.
To close this Section we mention that, as in the previous models, one can again consider a
participation decision by .H e r et h ee ﬀects depend a lot on bargaining power. In Appendix 5 we
show that an equilibrium exists, although we cannot show uniqueness in general. There we also
solve for the optimal subsidy, as in previous Sections, and we argue that liquidity actually does not
promote growth when  is too big. We summarize all of these results for this version of the model
as follows:
22Proposition 4 With imperfect credit and ﬁxed participation (¯  ¯ ), there exists a unique equilib-
rium as long as  i sn o tt o ob i g . W i t hi m p e r f e c tc r e d i ta n de n t r yb y, equilibrium exists and is
interior,  ∈ (0 ¯ ),i f is also not too big or too small. Equilibrium is generally ineﬃcient unless
three conditions are satisﬁed: entrepreneurs have bargaining power  =1 ; the supply of liquid assets
is abundant, 1 ≥ ∗
1 where
∗
1 ≡ (1 − 0)(1− )¯ ;
and, if there is entry by , the subsidy is set to
 =
0()[E + ˆ E( − )]
()
− 0()∆ˆ E( − )
5 Technology Transfer with Intermediation
It is commonly believed that ﬁnancial development facilitates innovation and growth. To investigate
this, we follow Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007) and Chiu and Meh (2011) by introducing banks
that operate while the idea market is open. They accept deposits at interest rate  and making
loans at , although in equilibrium competition yields  = . Borrowers can commit to repay
loans, and banks can commit to repay depositors, in numeraire goods in the next centralized market
(one can endogenize repayment, as in Berentsen et al. 2007). After meeting and observing the
realization () in the idea market,  can choose to deposit his assets in, or borrow from, banks
to facilitate trade with . Lack of commitment between  and  means that claims on liquid assets
are still needed to trade in the idea market, even with commitment between  and his bank.15

































15By banks here we mean any institution generally that facilitates credit and the reallocation of liquidity. If one
interprets this as a bank, narrowly, one can think of it issuing liabilities that serve as a payment instrument (inside
money) fully backed by deposits of liquid assets. Also, Chiu and Meh (2010) allow a ﬁxed cost  to banking, potentially
generating a loan-deposit spread   , and capture ﬁnancial development as a reduction in .H e r ew es e t =0 ,
implying  = ,a n dﬁnancial development is captured by the emergence of banking, not a reduction in the cost. An
alternative way to model ﬁnancial development implicitly is used in Silveira and Wright (2010), where it is assumed
that when  is short of liquidity he can try to raise additional funds, but this only succeeds with probability 1−,a n d
with probability  there is an exogenous breakdown and the deal falls through. In this setup, ﬁnancial development is
captured as a reduction in , and we approach perfect credit when  → 0. Here we prefer to model ﬁnancial activity
more explicitly.
23which is the same as (5) in the baseline model except for the last term, which gives the real value of
debt obligations to a bank  (if one has deposits in the bank then 0). Without loss in generality,
given quasi-linear utility, bank loans are settled every period in the centralized market. Also, as
discussed in the previous Section, we set 0 = 0
0 =0since holdings of illiquid assets are irrelevant
for ’s payoﬀ when they are priced fundamentally.
In the idea market, after observing (), the parties bargain under the recognition that 
can always obtain a loan, which means that he is never literally liquidity constrained, although the
intermediary will charge him interest . The outcome is
 =a r gm a x[ ∆ − (1 + )]
 [ − ∆]
1− 
since a payment to  of  now entails a cost to  of (1+). The solution is
()=∆
∙





It it easy to show: if   (1 + ) then  will deposit  and not trade, because the expected gain
does not cover the interest cost; and if  ≥ (1 + ) then  trades, depositing any excess liquidity
−() if   ¯ (), and borrowing ()− if   ¯ (),w i t h ¯ () generalizing






















[ − (1 + )](|)()
)

Since banking relaxes liquidity constraints, the last term does not depend on the entrepreneur’s
assets. Market clearing for liquid assets is simply  = ,w h e r et h es p r e a dh e r ei st h es a m ea st h e
previous Section. Goods market clearing is also the same as before, with
 =¯ E()+¯ E[ − |  (1 + )]Pr[  (1 + )]




() ≤ ,w i t h = when   0.
24Summarizing, equilibrium now consists of ( ¯ ) satisfying the following: asset market clearing




¯  = [(1 + )(1)+( 1− )(0)+]; (32)












(|)()= for   0 (33)
We can write goods market clearing (32) as ( ¯ )=0in ( ¯ ) space, with  ¯   0.
Similarly, (31) and (33) can be written ( ¯ )=0with
( ¯ ) ≡














deﬁning another negative relationship between  and ¯ . Given these two downward sloping curves,
we can show an equilibrium always exists but not that it is unique. There are two types of equilibria.
An equilibrium with  =0arises when there is a suﬃcient supply of liquid assets, in which case
ideas are traded in every meeting where   , and an equilibrium with   0 arises when liquid
assets are scarce. What is important to note is that the relevant threshold for suﬃcient liquidity is
now ∗∗
1 ,w h i c hi sb e l o wt h et h r e s h o l d∗
1 required for eﬃciency in the economy without banking
(see the Proposition 5 below for details).
We emphasize that banking enhances technology trade and hence innovation in two distinct
ways. The ﬁrst and more obvious function concerns the sharing of liquidity, similar to Diamond-
Dybvig (1983) banking: a given quantity of liquid assets can be reallocated to those who need it
most from those that do not need it, which entrepreneurs cannot do on as eﬀectively on their own,
without banks, because they do not know how much liquidity they need before the centralized market
closes. When the arrival rate  is low, this function is all the more important, because with a low
probability of needing it,  wants to economize all the more on liquidity. This is relevant to the
extent that, as some people argue, a shortage of assets is a real problem in the real world (e.g.,
Caballero 2006). The second and more novel function of banking is that it helps get around the
25holdup problem associated with investments in liquid assets by allowing entrepreneurs to undo these
investments. Intuitively, without banks, when  bargains for a high price,  w o u l dl i k et ob ea b l e
t oc l a i mt h a th es h o u l d n ’ th a v et op a ys om u c hb e c a u s eh en e e d st oc o v e rh i sc o s t ,t h es p r e a d;
but  counters that this is a sunk cost, which leads to a high price and ex ante underinvestment in
liquidity. When banks are open, however,  has the outside option of depositing his assets, which in
equilibrium earns  = , and therefore the cost is, in fact, not sunk!
Of course, not everyone can do this, since deposits can exceed loans only if  =0 , but since
each individual behaves competitively with respect to banking, the threat by  of putting his money
in the bank and earning the going rate is credible in bilateral negotiations. When  is low, this is
all the more important, because then the holdup problem is all the more severe. This eﬀect has not
been discussed, to our knowledge, before in this context, since the related papers on intermediation
and liquidity in similar models assume competitive markets without holdup problems. We think
that bargaining is especially pertinent for trade in the idea market, which is suﬃciently specialized
and thin that the competitive price-taking hypothesis seems less than compelling. Therefore, this
eﬀect of ﬁnancial intermediation may be especially signiﬁcant in the context of technology transfer,
and hence, in the context of innovation and growth.
0 1 ¯      
 ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑
0 ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑
 ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ? ↑ ↑
 ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑
 ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑
Table C: Eﬀects of Parameters with Intermediation
We report the eﬀects of parameter changes in Table C, assuming an equilibrium with   0
exists uniquely. For instance, an increase in , the fraction assets that are liquid, shifts the  curve
down while  is unaﬀected, reducing ,i n c r e a s i n g¯  and, in general equilibrium, raising  and
. We are left with generalizing the calculations in the previous model to endogenize participation
and solve for the optimal subsidy. We summarize the results below (see Appendix 6 for a proof).
Comparing the eﬃciency conditions here with those in Section 4, one can see explicitly the two
functions of banks: it allows us to get by with a smaller quantity of liquid assets; and we do not
26need  =1 , because banking eliminates the holdup problem associated with investment liquidity.
Proposition 5 There exists an equilibrium with ﬁnancial intermediation and ﬁxed participation
(¯  ¯ ). With entry by , an equilibrium with  =0exists if (¯  ¯ )¯  is not too big. Equilibrium
is generally ineﬃcient unless two conditions are satisﬁed: the supply of liquid assets is abundant,
1 ≥ ∗∗
1 ,w h e r e
∗∗
1 ≡ Ω(1 − 0)(1− )¯  = Ω∗
1
with ∗






[ +( 1− )](|)();
and, if there is entry by , the subsidy is set as in Proposition 4. Note in particular that eﬃciency
here does not require  =1 , as it did in the economy without banking.
6 A Little Evidence
Here we report some evidence to support the case that technology transfer can be an important
part of the innovation process, and that credit imperfections can hinder this process. Our empirical
analysis makes use of the ﬁrm level data obtained from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys conducted
between 2002 and 2005. The whole sample includes 4059 ﬁrms across 33 countries. We follow
closely the statistical method in Carluccio and Fally (2009), but appropriately modify the sample
and choice of variables to address our own research questions. Before going to detail, we highlight
two ﬁndings: (i) in some countries (e.g., Germany), direct technology transfers from outside parties
are an important way for ﬁrms to acquire new technology; (ii) ﬁrms’ use of technology transfer is
positively correlated with the ﬁnancial development in a country, particularly for small ﬁrms.
Using survey responses, we can determine whether a ﬁrm has acquired a new technology in the
period 2002-2005. Given our interest in direct technology transfer, we restrict attention to arm’s
length (recall footnote 7) transfers from outside parties. In particular, ﬁrms in our sample are asked
to report the most important way that they acquired new technology in the last 36 months. We
focus on transfers through new licensing or turnkey operations obtained from international sources,
domestic sources, universities and public institutions. We do not include transfers resulting from
27hiring, transfers from parent companies, internal development, and development in cooperation
with other partners. In Table 1 (all data tables are at the end of the paper), we report cross-
country summary statistics regarding the fraction of ﬁrms using direct technology transfers, and
its relationship to ﬁnancial development and ﬁrm size. Direct transfers are an important source of
technology acquisition in some countries. In Germany, 12.6% of ﬁrms in the survey reported that
the most important way they acquire technology is through new licensing or turnkey operations
from international sources, domestic sources, universities and public institutions.
To study the eﬀects of intermediation on technology transfer, we follow the literature and proxy
ﬁnancial development of a country by the ratio of private credit to GDP, taken from Beck, Demirg-
Kunt and Levine (1999). Table 2 indicates that, overall, a higher level of ﬁnancial development
is associated with higher rates of technology transfer. The positive correlation is more signiﬁcant
for smaller ﬁrms, and tends to become smaller or even reversed as ﬁrm size increases. Tables 3-5
report results from three regressions to uncover the eﬀects of ﬁnancial development. Other control
variables in the regression include market size, price of investment, openness, investment level, ﬁrm
size, presence of foreign capital and industry dummies.16 Table 3 reports results from a simple
OLS regression. This yields a positive relationship between private credit to GDP and technology
transfer, signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This positive relation is strongly strengthened when the square
of private credit to GDP is introduced, signiﬁcant at the 1% level, when we control for ﬁrm and
country speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s .
To deal with endogeneity issues, in Table 4, we follow Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) and
instrument for private credit over GDP by legal origin and perform a 2SLS regression. This leads
to considerably larger coeﬃcients on private credit to GDP than the OLS regressions. Technology
transfer is positively aﬀected by private credit to GDP, with signiﬁcant results at the 1% level in all
six speciﬁcations. The strong positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects still exists when controls for country and
ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics are excluded. Table 5 shows results from a probit regression. The results
are similar in terms of economic conclusions. The general pattern over all the diﬀerent speciﬁcations
is that the level of ﬁnancial development has positive but diminishing eﬀects on technology transfer,
16Variable deﬁnitions accompany the Tables; See Carluccio and Fally (2009) for a more detailed discussion of the
statistical approach.
28and the eﬀect is greater for smaller ﬁrms. This is all broadly consistent with our theory.
While the above analysis focuses on how technology transfer depends on the level of ﬁnancial
development in a country, there is also an empirical literature that studies how the decision to acquire
technology depends on a ﬁrm’s own liquidity and ﬁnancial constraints. Montalvo and Yafeh (1994),
e.g., examine investment in foreign technology by Japanese ﬁrms in the form of licensing agreements.
They conclude that “liquidity is an important consideration in the ﬁrm’s decision to invest in foreign
technology.” In particular, they ﬁnd that “Cash ﬂow has a positive impact, and  (cash ﬂow
of ﬁrms with limited access to main bank loans) is always positive and signiﬁcant. Furthermore, the
coeﬃcient of  is much higher than that of cash ﬂow, implying that non-keiretsu ﬁrms are
more liquidity constrained than group-aﬃliated ﬁrms”. Also, Gorodnichenko and Schnizter (2010)
study Business Environment and Enterprise Performances Surveys from 2002 to 2005, covering a
broad array of sectors and countries, and containing direct measures of innovation and ﬁnancial
constraints. They ﬁnd evidence that innovative activity is strongly inﬂuenced by ﬁnancial frictions.
These results are all consistent with the implications of our model. This discussion of the evidence
here is brief, and in the future more empirical work should be done to uncover just how important
technology transfer might be, how it is related to liquidity and ﬁnancial intermediation, and what
are the implications for growth. The goal here has been primarily to lay out a theoretical framework
within which one can organize such empirical work; we intend this Section to be mainly an illustration
of how some simple facts support the overall theory.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We conclude, as we began, by suggesting that the generation and implementation of new ideas are
major factors underlying economic performance and growth, and that liquidity and intermediation
play an important role in this process. We developed a novel endogenous growth model, where
productivity increases with knowledge and knowledge increases with research and development.
This process is aided by exchange, since those who come up with new ideas are not necessarily
the best at implementing them. Our idea market incorporated explicit frictions, including search,
bargaining and credit problems that hinder trade. The extent to which these matter depends of
29course on many institutional realities, including intellectual property rights, patent protection laws,
contract enforcement, the ability of innovators and entrepreneurs to ﬁnd each other in the ﬁrst place,
perhaps through third parties like patent agents or lawyers, and so on. We did not model all of these
institutional factors in detail, but tried to capture market frictions at a more abstract level using
search-and-bargaining theory. We also studied liquidity issues, and developed several interesting
interactions between credit and other frictions in the model.
There are good theoretical reasons to think that liquidity might matter for the issues at hand,
including the fact that knowledge is hard to collateralize. There is also much precedent for simply
assuming that liquidity is crucial, as in most imperfect credit models, and basically of all contract
theory (where, without liquidity constraints, the ﬁrst best can typically be achieved by an agent
simply buying out the principal). There is also a wealth of empirical work on liquidity, far too
much to survey here (again, see the sources cited in the Introduction and the references therein). A
goal here was to study how intermediaries ameliorate frictions, and thus aﬀect technology transfer,
innovation and growth. One result is that they allow the economy to get by with fewer liquid assets,
by facilitating the reallocation of liquidity from those that have more than they need to those that
have less. This helps get around the basic search/matching problem that implies entrepreneurs do
not always have suﬃcient liquidity when they contact an innovator.
This result is perhaps not too surprising, but still worth formalizing, especially since some people
argue that a shortage of liquid assets is a real problem (again, see Caballero 2006). A result that was
more surprising, at least it was to us before we saw it, is that intermediaries also mitigate holdup
problems in bargaining, by allowing entrepreneurs to undo otherwise sunk investments in liquidity.
Even without intermediation we think the framework provides useful insights, e.g., how to optimally
subsidize participation by innovators and/or entrepreneurs in the presence of search and knowledge
externalities. We provided existence, uniqueness or multiplicity, eﬃciency and comparative static
results for a series of increasing intricate models, although the framework is still quite tractable, and
can potentially be extended in several directions, both in terms of theory and obviously in terms of
empirical work. This is left to future research.
30Appendix 1: The Model with Capital
Consider a CRS technology (),w h e r e is capital and  is the talent of the owner,
assumed a ﬁxed input. We subsume depreciation in the notation . H e r ew es t u d yt h ep l a n n e r ’ s
problem (equilibrium is similar):
 ()= m a x
01010
{() − (0 + 1) −  +  [()0]}
st  = [1(1 + )1(1 + )]+( 1− )(0 0) − 0 + 
 = 1 +( 1− )0,  ∈ [0 ¯ ],  = E
After eliminating the constraints, we take the FOC to get:
0 : 0()0
 = 






 :  =
¡
0()[1 − 0 − 1
1 + 0




 = (0 0), etc. The envelope conditions are
()=Φ + (00)() and ()=( 0
 +1− )













We seek a balanced growth path where , , , 1 and 0 grow at () while 0, 1 and 



















 = 1 +( 1− )0 +( 1− ) − () + 
0





 = 1 +( 1− )0
31solve for (0 1 0 1 ). It is straightforward to study this model following the analysis
in the text without capital.
Appendix 2: Equilibrium with Two-Sided Entry
Here we show that there exists a unique equilibrium in the two-sided participation model of
Section 3, where  ∈ (0 ¯ ) and  ∈ (0 ¯ ),a sl o n ga s and  are neither too high nor too low.
The equilibrium conditions are
¯ 





∆(¯ )[E +( 1− )
( )








ˆ E( − )] (36)










(11) ˆ E( − )
i
 (38)
In (¯ ) space, the former gives a strictly increasing curve and the latter a strictly decreasing
curve. The unique intersection determines equilibrium (¯ ). Denote this wage by ¯ ( ),w h e r e
 ¯   0 and  ¯   0.A l s o ,¯ ( ) gets arbitrarily large for entry costs suﬃciently small.
The (¯ ) pair still needs to satisfy goods market clearing
¯ 

= [E + (1)ˆ E( − )][(1 + )(1) − (0)] + (0)+
and we need to check the implied ( ) is interior,
 =
¯ − (0) − 
[E + (1)ˆ E( − )][(1 + )(1) − (0)]
∈ (0 ¯ ) (39)
 =  ∈ (0 ¯ ) (40)
The numerator in (39) is a strictly increasing function of ¯  and is 0 for an unique ¯ .S ow ec a nﬁnd
ˆ  and ˆ  such that ¯ (ˆ  ˆ ) − (0) −  =0 , implying  =  =0 .B y c o n t i n u i t y ,w ec a n
then ﬁnd  and  close to but bigger than ˆ  and ˆ  such that(39)-(40) are satisﬁed.
The above discussion establishes (¯ ) is unique. To see that ( ) is unique, note that
equilibrium is given by an intersection of two curves in the ( ) space. One is the strictly
negative relationship between  and  implicitly deﬁned by (34) given ¯ ; the other is the strictly
positive relationship deﬁned by (40) given .T h e n( ) is determined by the unique intersection.
32Appendix 3: Multiple Equilibria
Here we provide an example to show supply can be nonmonotone, and hence we can get multi-
plicity, in the model of Section 4 without the assumption made in the text that  is not too big. Set
 =0 . Letting ()=1− exp(−) it is easy to solve for:
 [0(¯ )] =
½
1 − ¯  if ¯  ≤ 1
0 if ¯ 1 and  [1(¯ )] =
½
1 − ¯ (1 + ) if ¯  ≤ 1+
0 if ¯ 1+





 [(1 +  − ¯ )+( 1− )(1 − ¯ )] if ¯  ≤ 1
 [(1 +  − ¯ )] if ¯  ∈ (11+)
0 if ¯  ≥ 1+





 − ¯ log(1 + ) if ¯  ≤ 1







if ¯  ∈ (11+)
0 if ¯  ≥ 1+
Since ∆0(¯ )  0 for ¯ 1+ and ∆(1 + )=0 , ∆(¯ ) is strictly increasing and approaches









∆(¯ ) if ¯  ≤ ¯ 0




∈ (01] if − log(1 + )
(11+) if − log(1 + )





( − )(|)(). Then, after simpliﬁcation,
0(¯ )=
Ã




















where ∆0(¯ )  0 for ¯ 1+.
Therefore supply can have a positive slope when the distribution is suﬃciently concentrated
over the relevant region, as shown in Figure 6. Then it is easy to specify demand so that we get
multiplicity. Note that the above construction uses ¯ 1+ as well as  . The restriction made
in the text that  is not too big rules this out and allows us to prove uniqueness.
Appendix 4: The Entrepreneur Problem
Here we formulate ’s maximization problem as in Section 4. Start with the intuitive expression





























33The ﬁrst term is ’s payoﬀ when he does not meet anyone. The second is his payoﬀ when he meets
 but there are no gains from trade. The third is his payoﬀ from (unconstrained) trade at .T h e
fourth is his payoﬀ from (constrained) trade at ¯ .T h eﬁnal term is his payoﬀ to not trading because
he cannot meet ’s reservation price. Now algebra leads to (27).
Given this, let  = (1 + ),a n dw r i t e˜  ()= 
 () where




























1+00. Then we can rewrite the control variable in ’s maximization
problem as ,a n dt h eo b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o na si n( 2 6 ) .
Appendix 5: Entry with Credit Frictions
Here we substantiate some claims made in Section 4. Equilibrium ( ¯ ) satisﬁes







¯ − (1 + ) [1(¯ )] − (1 − ) [0(¯ )] −  =0 (42)






( − )(|)()=0 (43)
plus the entry condition

















As  increases, both the upward sloping  curve and the downward sloping  curve shift up
in ( ¯ ) space. Therefore, (41)-(43) deﬁne an increasing and continuous function ¯  = () from
[0 ¯ ] onto [¯ (0) ¯ (¯ )].M o r e o v e r ,( ¯ ) pairs that satisfy (41)-(43) deﬁne a function  = (¯ )
with range [¯ (0) ¯ (¯ )] We now need to check the entry condition. First, since ¯ () is strictly
decreasing in , for any ¯  ∈ [¯ (0) ¯ (¯ )] and  = (¯ ), there is a unique  ∈ [0 ¯ ] satisfying
(44). So we can construct a continuous mapping from ¯  ∈ [¯ (0) ¯ (¯ )] to [0 ¯ ]. Together with
the continuous increasing function (), this ensures an equilibrium exists.








 + ¯ 0 


























































− (1 + )0(1)0























































 − ¯ 
0
∆ ¯ 0 
∆2∆0 0 −¯ 


0 ¯  −(1 + )(1)+(0)0
−Ω 1
∆ Ω 
∆2∆0 1 −(E + Φ)
−





∆ ¯  0 −


























So  ¯ 1 =0when  =1and  ¯ 1  0 when  ∈ (01) for some 0  1.S i n c e ¯  =




























Therefore, 1  0 when  ∈ (01].
35Appendix 6: Equilibrium with Intermediation
We prove existence in the model of Section 5. First consider ﬁxed participation. Then ( ¯ )=
0 deﬁnes ¯  as a decreasing function of  in ( ¯ ) space, with intercept ¯ 0 given by the solution
to (32) with






As  →∞ , ¯  converges monotonically to ¯ 1  0,d e ﬁned as the solution to (32) with  =¯ E().
As regards the ( ¯ ) curve, ﬁrst,  =0when ¯  ≥ ¯ 2,w i t h ¯ 2 solving







[ +( 1− )](|)()
Second, the ( ¯ ) curve hits  =  as ¯  → 0, and it is strictly decreasing for  ∈ [0).T h e s e
observations ensure an intersection (interior or not), so equilibrium exists. There are two types of
equilibria: (i)  =0and ¯  =¯ 0;a n d( i i ) ∈ (0) and ¯  ∈ (¯ 1 ¯ 0). When equilibrium with
  0 exists uniquely, ¯ 2  ¯ 0 and the  curve crosses the  curve from above. We conclude
that when  =0 ,  has no eﬀect; and when   0 ar i s ei n or  lowers  and increases 
and . This completes the case without entry. The case with entry is similar.
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Technology Transfer: Firm-speciﬁc variable. Binary variable equal to one if the ﬁrm’s (self reported)
most important source of technology is any of: “new licensing or turnkey opera-
tions from international sources,” “new licensing or turnkey operations from do-
mestic sources,” “new licensing or turnkey operations from domestic sources,”
“obtained from universities or public institutions.” [2005:Q61b]
Independent - Explanatory
Private credit/GDP: Country-speciﬁc variable. The ratio of private credit by deposit money banks
to GDP, used as a proxy for a country’s level of ﬁnancial development. Taken
from Beck et al (1999).
Private credit/GDP: Country-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e .The previous term squared.
Independent - Instruments
Legal origin: Country-speciﬁc variable. A set of three dummy variables, French-civil,
German-civil, and common law, indicating the origin of a country’s legal sys-
tem. A country’s legal code can have multiple inﬂuences. Taken from Djankov
et al (2007), and the CIA World Factbook.
Independent - Controls
Market size: Country-speciﬁc variable. The population of the country in which a ﬁrm oper-
ates. Taken from Penn World Tables 6.3.
Price level of investment: Country-speciﬁc variable. PPP over investment level, divided by exchange rate
with US$, multiplied by 100. Taken from Penn World Tables 6.3.
Openness: Country-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e .Exports plus imports, divided by GDP. Taken from
Penn World Tables 6.3.
Investment level: Country-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e . Investment as a share of GDP. Taken from Penn
World Tables 6.4.
Firm size: Firm-speciﬁc variable. Number of permanent, full-time employees employed at
a ﬁrm, self reported. [2005:Q66a]
Presence of foreign
capital:
Firm-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e .Dummy variable equal to one if a positive percentage of
a ﬁrm is owned by foreign individuals or businesses, self reported. [2005:S5b]
Industry dummies: Firm-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e . A set of seven dummy variables designating a ﬁrm’s
industry. A ﬁrm belongs to a certain industry if the majority of its operations
are in the speciﬁed ﬁeld. Industries are: mining, construction, manufacturing,
transport, wholesale, real estate, hotel and restaurant services, and “other” if
none of these are applicable. [2005:Q2a-g; 2002:q2a-g]
40Table 1: Summary of Country Statistics
Technology Transfer Private Credit to GDP
Number of Observations Mean Std. Dev. Mean
Albania 82 0.024 0.155 0.118
Armenia 182 0.005 0.074 0.069
Azerbaijan 164 0.110 0.314
Belarus 93 0.011 0.104
Bosnia 89 0.011 0.106 0.391
Azerbaijan 83 0.048 0.215 0.378
Croatia 94 0.000 0.000 0.563
Czech Republic 78 0.077 0.268 0.330
Estonia 40 0.048 0.158 0.619
Georgia 56 0.054 0.227 0.113
Germany 277 0.126 0.333 1.109
Greece 206 0.024 0.154 0.715
Hungary 91 0.099 0.300 0.475
Ireland 191 0.037 0.188 1.421
Kazakhstan 182 0.033 0.179 0.276
Korea 94 0.128 0.335 0.894
Kyrgyzstan 86 0.093 0.292 0.072
Latvia 51 0.098 0.300 0.549
Lithunia 57 0.053 0.225 0.328
Macedonia, FYR 63 0.032 0.177 0.226
Moldova 136 0.044 0.206 0.208
Poland 326 0.058 0.235 0.277
Portugal 126 0.016 0.125 1.403
Romania 247 0.045 0.207 0.166
Russia Federation 178 0.039 0.195 0.227
Serbia & Montenegro 110 0.018 0.134 0.229
Slovak Republic 50 0.060 0.240 0.314
Slovenia 65 0.015 0.124 0.530
Spain 185 0.016 0.127 1.301
Tajikistan 70 0.014 0.120
Turkey 162 0.025 0.156 0.184
Ukraine 181 0.028 0.164
Uzbekistan 64 0.016 0.125
Note: Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey 2005.
41Table 2: Percentage of Firms Engaging in Technology Transfer by Firm Size











All Firms 4.16 5.13
Note: Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey 2005.
42Table 3: OLS Regression of Technology Transfer on Private Credit, Uninstrumented
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: Technology Transfer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private credit to GDP 0.0139* 0.0287* 0.0276* 0.1308*** 0.1607*** 0.1649***
(0.0080) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0381) (0.0464) (0.0468)
Private credit to GDP2 -0.0794*** -0.0839*** -0.0870***
(0.0253) (0.0774) (0.0279)
Log market size 0.0191*** 0.0181*** 0.0158*** 0.0148***
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0041)
Price level of investment -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004
(0.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004)
Openness 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0004***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Investment level -0.0010* -0.0010* -0.0016*** -0.0016***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Log ﬁrm size 0.0061*** 0.0062***
(0.0022) (0.0022)
Presence of 0.0050 0.0049
foreign capital (0.0110) 0.0110)
Industry dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Intercept 0.0395*** -0.1504*** -0.1730*** 0.0153 -0.1211** -0.1443
(0.0055) (0.0476) (0.0508) (0.0095) (0.0485) (0.0515)
Number of observations 3587 3509 3509 3587 3509 3509
Note: * ≡ Signiﬁcant at 10% level, ** ≡ Signiﬁcant at 5% level, and *** ≡ Signiﬁcant at 1% level. Standard
deviations are in parentheses.
43Table 4: Two-Stage Least Squares Regression of Technology Transfer on Private Credit
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: Technology Transfer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private credit to GDP 0.0645*** 0.3366*** 0.3202*** 0.5517*** 0.4168*** 0.4073***
(0.0137) (0.0608) (0.0585) (0.0764) 0.0764) (0.0755)
Private credit to GDP2 -0.3209*** -0.0768* -0.0802*
(0.0495) (0.0448) (0.0447)
Firm size × Private credit to GDP -0.0000** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -.0000** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Log market size 0.0263*** 0.0255*** 0.0223*** 0.0215***
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0049) (0.0048)
Price level of investment -0.0067*** -0.0064*** -0.0059*** -0.0056***
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Openness 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0009*** 0.0008***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 0.0002
Investment level -0.0044*** -0.0041*** -0.0046*** -0.0043***
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Firm size 0.0000** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000*** 0.0000*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002)
Presence of foreign capital 0.0138 0.0140
(0.0112) (0.0111)
Industry dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Intercept 0.0121** 0.0350 0.0085 -0.0932*** 0.0378 0.0121
(0.0081) 0.0612) (0.0622) (0.0182) (0.0605) (0.0616)
Number of observations 3587 3509 3509 3587 3509 3509
Note: Private credit is instrumented by legal origin, * ≡ Signiﬁcant at 10% level, ** ≡ Signiﬁcant at 5% level, and
*** ≡ Signiﬁcant at 1% level. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
44Table 5: Probit Regression of Technology Transfer on Private Credit
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: Technology Transfer
(1) (2) (3)
Private credit to GDP 0.5640*** 0.8845*** 0.8934***
(0.1147) (0.3044) (0.3002)
Firm size×private credit to GDP -0.0004** -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Log market size 0.2618*** 0.2544***
(0.0434) (0.0438)




Firm size 0.0003** 0.0002* 0.0002***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Industry dummies No No Yes
Intercept -1.9511*** -4.2743*** -4.3427***
(0.0640) (0.5348) (0.5723)
Number of observations 3587 3509 3467
Note: Private credit is instrumented by legal origin, * ≡ Signiﬁcant at 10% level, ** ≡ Signiﬁcant at 5% level, and

















σe = B(σi, x
∆ )
σe = σi
A0,A3 : No trade
A1 : Non binding trade
A2 : Binding trade
Figure 2: Bargaining Outcome with Credit Frictions






γAδ or θ ↑







σe = σi(1 + r)
A0
A0 : No trade & Save
A1 : Trade & Save




Figure 5: Bargaining Outcome with Intermediation



































Figure 6: Example: e = 1, i  beta(a;b)
6